

119TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

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To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of undersea communication cables vital to Taiwan’s national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People’s Republic of China, and for other purposes.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

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Mr. CURTIS introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_

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## **A BILL**

To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of undersea communication cables vital to Taiwan’s national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People’s Republic of China, and for other purposes.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3       **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4       This Act may be cited as the “Taiwan Undersea  
5       Cable Resilience Initiative Act”.

6       **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7       Congress finds the following:

1           (1) Undersea communication cables (in this Act  
2           referred to as “undersea cables”) are critical infra-  
3           structure essential for global communication, com-  
4           merce, and national security, particularly for Tai-  
5           wan, whose economic and security stability relies  
6           heavily on undersea cable connectivity.

7           (2) The Government of the People’s Republic of  
8           China has increasingly used gray zone tactics to un-  
9           dermine the security and sovereignty of Taiwan, in-  
10          cluding suspected sabotage of undersea cables in and  
11          around Taiwan, such as the incidents involving the  
12          severing of cables around the Matsu Islands of Tai-  
13          wan and other key regions in 2023 and 2025.

14          (3) Undersea cables are a primary target in the  
15          strategy of the Government of the People’s Republic  
16          of China to cripple the communication capabilities of  
17          Taiwan in the event of a military conflict, as part  
18          of broader hybrid warfare tactics. Disruption of un-  
19          dersea cables would significantly impact the ability  
20          of Taiwan to communicate both domestically and  
21          internationally, leading to a breakdown in military,  
22          economic, and social functions.

23          (4) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on  
24          undersea cables has been compounded by an increas-  
25          ing number of foreign vessels suspected of involve-

1       ment in sabotage, including Chinese-linked vessels,  
2       which are perceived as direct threats to Taiwan’s  
3       critical infrastructure.

4           (5) The ability of the Government of the Peo-  
5       ple’s Republic of China to disrupt or sever undersea  
6       cables is a critical element of its military strategy  
7       aimed at softening Taiwan’s defenses and isolating  
8       Taiwan from international support in the event of  
9       an invasion or military confrontation.

10          (6) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, par-  
11       ticularly the People’s Republic of China, have in-  
12       creased the risk of sabotage and disruption to un-  
13       dersea cables serving Taiwan and other nations. No-  
14       tably, in February 2023, the Matsu Islands of Tai-  
15       wan experienced major internet disruptions due to  
16       two undersea cables being severed, with suspicions  
17       pointing toward deliberate external interference.  
18       Furthermore, in January 2025, Chunghwa Telecom  
19       reported damage to an international undersea cable  
20       and identified a “suspicious vessel”—the Chinese-  
21       linked cargo ship Shunxin39—near the affected  
22       area. The Coast Guard of Taiwan has indicated con-  
23       cerns that that vessel may have been involved in de-  
24       liberately cutting the cable. In a subsequent inci-  
25       dent, Taiwan seized the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58,

1       suspected of deliberately severing an undersea cable.  
2       The Coast Guard of Taiwan acknowledged the possi-  
3       bility of China's involvement as part of a "grey area  
4       intrusion".

5           (7) Since 2023, there have been at least 11  
6       cases of damage to undersea cables around Taiwan  
7       and a similar number in the Baltic Sea, with au-  
8       thorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting Chinese  
9       and Russian involvement in several incidents, al-  
10      though some damages have been attributed to nat-  
11      ural causes. Those incidents highlight the vulner-  
12      ability of those critical systems to gray zone tactics  
13      and the difficulty of proving sabotage or holding per-  
14      petrators accountable.

15          (8) The sabotage of undersea cables constitutes  
16      gray zone tactics designed to destabilize and under-  
17      mine international security without direct military  
18      confrontation.

19          (9) Several regional mechanisms have been es-  
20      tablished to bolster the security of undersea cables,  
21      including the Nordic Warden initiative for maritime  
22      domain awareness and the Quad Partnership for  
23      Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at enhanc-  
24      ing the security and resilience of undersea cables in  
25      the Indo-Pacific.

1           (10) To counter the threats described in this  
2           section and safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is  
3           imperative for the United States and its allies to  
4           take decisive action to bolster Taiwan’s defenses for  
5           undersea cables and foster international cooperation  
6           to protect those critical assets.

7   **SEC. 3. TAIWAN UNDERSEA CABLE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE.**

8           (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 360 days after  
9           the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of  
10          State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the  
11          Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the  
12          Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the Sec-  
13          retary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initia-  
14          tive to be known as the “Taiwan Undersea Cable Resil-  
15          ience Initiative” (in this section referred to as the “Initia-  
16          tive”).

17          (b) PRIORITY.—The Initiative shall prioritize the pro-  
18          tection and resilience of undersea cables near Taiwan,  
19          with a focus on countering threats from the People’s Re-  
20          public of China to the critical infrastructure of Taiwan.

21          (c) KEY FOCUS AREAS.—

22                (1) ADVANCED MONITORING AND DETECTION  
23                CAPABILITIES.—In carrying out the Initiative, the  
24                Secretary of State, in coordination with the Sec-  
25                retary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of

1 Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced undersea  
2 cable monitoring systems for Taiwan capable of de-  
3 tecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-  
4 time, including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate,  
5 of early warnings from global intelligence networks.

6 (2) RAPID RESPONSE PROTOCOLS.—In carrying  
7 out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall—

8 (A) establish rapid response protocols for  
9 repairing severed undersea cables or mitigating  
10 disruptions; and

11 (B) work with allies of the United States  
12 to help Taiwan develop the logistical capacity to  
13 respond quickly to attacks on undersea cables  
14 and minimize downtime.

15 (3) ENHANCING MARITIME DOMAIN AWARE-  
16 NESS.—In carrying out the Initiative—

17 (A) the Secretary of the Navy and the  
18 Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collabora-  
19 tion with the Coast Guard of Taiwan and re-  
20 gional allies, shall enhance maritime domain  
21 awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the de-  
22 tection of suspicious vessels or activities near  
23 critical undersea cable routes; and

24 (B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard  
25 shall assist in joint patrols and surveillance,

1 particularly in the Taiwan Strait and sur-  
2 rounding maritime zones, to monitor potential  
3 threats and prevent sabotage.

4 (4) INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PRO-  
5TECTION.—

6 (A) IN GENERAL.—In carrying out the Ini-  
7 tiative, the Secretary of State shall seek to es-  
8 tablish cooperative frameworks with regional al-  
9 lies and global partners to protect the undersea  
10 cable networks near Taiwan.

11 (B) ELEMENTS.—The frameworks estab-  
12 lished under subparagraph (A) shall provide for  
13 participation by the United States in joint  
14 drills, intelligence-sharing platforms, and col-  
15 laborative surveillance operations to enhance  
16 collective security against sabotage.

17 (5) TAIWAN-SPECIFIC CABLE HARDENING.—In  
18 carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State  
19 shall encourage and support the hardening of critical  
20 undersea cables near Taiwan, including reinforcing  
21 cables, improving burial depths, and using more re-  
22 silient materials to reduce vulnerability to natural  
23 disasters and deliberate interference.

1 **SEC. 4. COUNTERING CHINA'S GRAY ZONE TACTICS.**

2 (a) WORKING WITH PARTNERS TO COUNTER CHI-  
3 NESE SABOTAGE.—The President shall work with Taiwan  
4 and like-minded international partners to implement strat-  
5 egies that directly counter the use by the Government of  
6 the People's Republic of China of undersea cable sabotage  
7 as part of its gray zone warfare, including by increasing  
8 diplomatic pressure on that Government to adhere to  
9 international norms regarding the protection of undersea  
10 infrastructure.

11 (b) RAISING AWARENESS.—The President shall work  
12 with Taiwan to raise global awareness of the risks posed  
13 by interference by the Government of the People's Repub-  
14 lic of China in undersea cables, including through public  
15 diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and international  
16 forums that address gray zone tactics and the protection  
17 of critical infrastructure.

18 **SEC. 5. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SAB-**  
19 **OTAGE OF UNDERSEA CABLES.**

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the  
21 sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any  
22 person of the People's Republic of China that the Presi-  
23 dent determines is responsible for or complicit in dam-  
24 aging undersea cables critical to the national security of  
25 Taiwan.



1 (b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions de-  
2 scribed in this subsection are the following:

3 (1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President  
4 shall exercise all of the powers granted by the Inter-  
5 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50  
6 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block  
7 and prohibit all transactions in all property and in-  
8 terests in property of a person described in sub-  
9 section (a), if such property and interests in prop-  
10 erty are in the United States, come within the  
11 United States, or are or come within the possession  
12 or control of a United States person.

13 (2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR  
14 PAROLE.—

15 (A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An  
16 alien described in subsection (a) shall be—

17 (i) inadmissible to the United States;

18 (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other  
19 documentation to enter the United States;  
20 and

21 (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted  
22 or paroled into the United States or to re-  
23 ceive any other benefit under the Immigra-  
24 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et  
25 seq.).

1 (B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

2 (i) IN GENERAL.—The visa or other  
3 entry documentation of an alien described  
4 in subsection (a) shall be revoked, regard-  
5 less of when such visa or other entry docu-  
6 mentation is or was issued.

7 (ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revoca-  
8 tion under clause (i) shall—

9 (I) take effect immediately; and

10 (II) automatically cancel any  
11 other valid visa or entry documenta-  
12 tion that is in the possession of the  
13 alien.

14 (c) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

15 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may ex-  
16 ercise all authorities provided under sections 203  
17 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic  
18 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out  
19 this section.

20 (2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, at-  
21 tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a  
22 violation of this section or any regulation, license, or  
23 order issued to carry out this section shall be subject  
24 to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c)  
25 of section 206 of the International Emergency Eco-

1        nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same ex-  
2        tent as a person that commits an unlawful act de-  
3        scribed in subsection (a) of that section.

4        (d) EXCEPTIONS.—

5            (1) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVI-  
6        TIES.—This section shall not apply with respect to  
7        activities subject to the reporting requirements  
8        under title V of the National Security Act of 1947  
9        (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intel-  
10       lligence activities of the United States.

11           (2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTER-  
12        NATIONAL AGREEMENTS.—Sanctions under sub-  
13        section (b)(2) shall not apply with respect to the ad-  
14        mission of an alien to the United States if such ad-  
15        mission is necessary to comply with the obligations  
16        of the United States under the Agreement regarding  
17        the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at  
18        Lake Success on June 26, 1947, and entered into  
19        force on November 21, 1947, between the United  
20        Nations and the United States, or the Convention on  
21        Consular Relations, done at Vienna on April 24,  
22        1963, and entered into force on March 19, 1967, or  
23        other international obligations of the United States.

24           (3) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF  
25        GOODS.—

1 (A) IN GENERAL.—The authorities and re-  
2 quirements to impose sanctions under this sec-  
3 tion shall not include the authority or require-  
4 ment to impose sanctions on the importation of  
5 goods.

6 (B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph,  
7 the term “good” means any article, natural or  
8 manmade substance, material, supply or manu-  
9 factured product, including inspection and test  
10 equipment, and excluding technical data.

11 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

12 (1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms  
13 “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the  
14 meanings given those terms in section 101 of the  
15 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

16 (2) PERSON OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF  
17 CHINA.—The term “person of the People’s Republic  
18 of China” means—

19 (A) an individual who is a citizen or na-  
20 tional of the People’s Republic of China;

21 (B) an entity owned or controlled by the  
22 Government of the People’s Republic of China,  
23 organized under the laws of the People’s Re-  
24 public of China, or otherwise subject to the ju-

1 jurisdiction of the Government of the People's  
2 Republic of China.

3 (3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term  
4 “United States person” means—

5 (A) any United States citizen or an alien  
6 lawfully admitted for permanent residence to  
7 the United States;

8 (B) an entity organized under the laws of  
9 the United States or of any jurisdiction within  
10 the United States, including any foreign branch  
11 of such an entity; or

12 (C) any person in the United States.

13 **SEC. 6. SEMIANNUAL REPORT.**

14 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-  
15 ment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Presi-  
16 dent shall submit to Congress a report detailing—

17 (1) any incidents of interference in undersea ca-  
18 bles near Taiwan; and

19 (2) any actions taken in response to such inci-  
20 dents.